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Abstract—Aggregate location data is often used to support
smart services and applications, e.g., generating live traffic maps
or predicting visits to businesses. In this paper, we present the
first study on the feasibility of membership inference attacks
on aggregate location time-series. We introduce a game-based
definition of the adversarial task, and cast it as a classification
problem where machine learning can be used to distinguish
whether or not a target user is part of the aggregates.
We empirically evaluate the power of these attacks on both
raw and differentially private aggregates using two mobility
datasets. We find that membership inference is a serious privacy
threat, and show how its effectiveness depends on the adversary’s
prior knowledge, the characteristics of the underlying location
data, as well as the number of users and the timeframe on
which aggregation is performed. Although differentially private
mechanisms can indeed reduce the extent of the attacks, they also
yield a significant loss in utility. Moreover, a strategic adversary
mimicking the behavior of the defense mechanism can greatly
limit the protection they provide. Overall, our work presents a
novel methodology geared to evaluate membership inference on
aggregate location data in real-world settings and can be used by
providers to assess the quality of privacy protection before data
release or by regulators to detect violations.
I. INTRODUCTION
The ability to model the context in which users and
applications operate enables the development of intelligent
applications and pervasive personalized services. Naturally,
location information plays a crucial role in shaping such
context, motivating the continuous collection of users’ location
data by applications and service providers. In some cases,
entities may be interested in only collecting or releasing
aggregate location statistics, which, for instance, can be used
to calculate the average speed along a road and generate live
traffic maps [3, 34], or to estimate the number of people at
a restaurant and predict availability and waiting times [21].
Apple also lets iOS as well as third-party app developers
collect differentially private aggregate statistics about emojis,
deep links, as well as locations, via dedicated APIs [31].
Moreover, aggregate location information is relied upon by
companies like factual.com to offer statistics to advertisers, or
like Telefonica, which provides consultancy services around
footfall measures calculated from network events [30].
Aggregation is often considered as a way to hinder the
exposure of individual users’ data [21]; however, access to, or
release of, aggregate location statistics might ultimately violate
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privacy of the individuals that are part of the aggregates [22,
36]. In this paper, we focus on membership inference attacks,
whereby an adversary attempts to determine whether or not
location data of a target user is part of the aggregates.
Motivation. The ability of an adversary to ascertain the
presence of an individual in aggregate location time-series
constitutes an obvious privacy threat if the aggregates relate
to a group of users that share a sensitive characteristic. For
instance, learning that an individual is part of a dataset aggre-
gating movements of Alzheimer’s patients implies learning that
she suffers from the disease. Similarly, inferring that statistics
collected over a sensitive timeframe or sensitive locations
include a particular user also harm the individual’s privacy.
Recent work [22] also shows that an adversary with some
prior knowledge about a user’s mobility profile can exploit
aggregate information to improve this knowledge, or even
localize her. Also, users’ “trajectories” can in some cases be
extracted from aggregate mobility data, even without prior
knowledge [36]. However, in order to mount these attacks, the
adversary needs to know that the user is part of the aggregate
dataset, which further motivates our research objectives.
Membership inference can also be leveraged by providers
to evaluate the quality of privacy protection on the aggregates
before releasing them, and by regulators, to support enforce-
ment of individual’s rights (e.g., the right to be forgotten)
or detect violations. For instance, if a service provider is
not allowed to release location data, or make it available to
third-parties even in aggregate form, one can use membership
inference attacks to verify possible misuse of the data.
Approach & Results. In this paper, we present the first for-
malization of membership inference in the context of location
data. We model the problem as a game in which an adversary
aims at distinguishing location aggregates that include data
of a target user from those that do not. We instantiate the
distinguishing task using a machine learning classifier trained
on the prior knowledge of the adversary (e.g., past users’
locations, aggregates of groups including and excluding the
target user), and use it to infer the target’s membership in
unseen aggregate statistics.
We evaluate our approach on two mobility datasets with
different characteristics, and find that releasing raw aggregates
poses a significant privacy threat. In particular, our results show
that membership inference is very successful when the adver-
sary knows the locations of a small subset of users including
her target – the classifier achieves up to 0.83 Area Under Curve
(AUC) with 100 users per aggregation group – or when she
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has prior information for user groups on which she attempts to
infer membership (up to 1.0 AUC even with 9,500 users per
group). In weaker adversarial knowledge settings, membership
inference is less effective but still yields non-negligible privacy
leakage. Overall, we find that the number of users as well as the
timeframe used to compute the aggregation have a profound
effect on the accuracy of the attacks. Interestingly, certain
characteristics of the data, like regularity and sparseness, also
affect the power of the membership inference adversarial task.
We also study membership inference on statistics protected
using defense mechanisms based on differential privacy. We
find that they are generally effective at preventing inference,
although at the cost of a non-negligible reduction in utility.
Moreover, we show that a strategic adversary mimicking the
behavior of the mechanisms – i.e., training the classifier on
noisy aggregates – can reduce their protection (up to 83%).
Contributions. In summary, this paper makes the following
contributions: (i) we introduce a generic methodology to study
membership privacy in location aggregates that formalizes
membership inference on aggregate location data as a dis-
tinguishability game and instantiates the distinguishing task
with a machine learning classifier; (ii) we deploy our methods
to quantify privacy leakage on raw aggregates, using two
real-world mobility datasets; and (iii) we illustrate how our
techniques can be used to study the effectiveness of defense
mechanisms aimed at preventing these attacks.
Paper Organization. The rest of this paper is organized as
follows. The next section reviews related work. Then, we
formalize the problem of membership inference on aggregate
location time-series in Section III and present the methodology
used to evaluate it in Section IV. In Section V, we introduce
our experimental setup and, in Section VI, present the results
of our experiments on raw aggregates. After evaluating differ-
entially private defense mechanisms in Section VII, the paper
concludes in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we review previous work on membership
inference, differentially private release of location data, as well
as location privacy.
Membership inference attacks. Such attacks aim to deter-
mine the presence of target individuals within a dataset. This
is relevant in many settings, e.g., in the context of genomic
research, where data inherently tied to sensitive information,
such as health stats or physical traits, is commonly released
in aggregate form for Genome Wide Association Studies
(GWAS) [35]. Homer et al. [15] show that one can learn
whether a target individual was part of a case-study group
associated to a certain disease by comparing the target’s
profile against the aggregates of the case study and those
of a reference population obtained from public sources. This
attack has then been extended by Wang et al. [33] to use
correlations within the human genome, reducing the need for
prior knowledge about the target. Also, Backes et al. [2] show
that membership inference can be mounted against individuals
contributing their microRNA expressions to scientific studies.
Another line of work focuses on membership inference in
machine learning models. Shokri et al. [26] show that such
models may leak information about data records on which they
were trained. Hitaj et al. [14] present active inference attacks
on deep neural networks in collaborative settings, while Hayes
et al. [13] focus on privacy leakage from generative models
in Machine Learning as a Service applications. Moreover,
Buscher et al. [4] recently evaluate membership inference in
the context of data aggregation in smart metering, studying
how many household readings need to be aggregated in order
to protect privacy of individual profiles in a smart grid.
Overall, our research differs from these works in that we
focus on membership inference over aggregate location time-
series, which present different characteristics and challenges
than the other domains. Despite the importance of location
data in terms of its availability, frequency of collection, and the
amount of sensitive information it carries [25], this problem,
to the best of our knowledge, has not been examined before.
Differentially private mechanisms. Differential privacy
(DP) [8] can be used to mitigate membership inference,
as its indistinguishability-based definition guarantees that the
presence or the absence of an individual does not significantly
affect the output of the data release. Li et al. [18] introduce
a framework geared to formalize the notion of Positive vs
Negative Membership Privacy, considering an adversary pa-
rameterized by her prior knowledge. However, to the best of
our knowledge, no specific technique has been presented to in-
stantiate their framework in our setting. Common mechanisms
to achieve DP include using noise from the Laplacian [8] or
the Gaussian distribution [9] (see Section VII).
Specific to the context of spatio-temporal data are the
techniques proposed by Machanavajjhala et al. [19], who
use synthetic data generation to release differentially private
mobility patterns of commuters in Minnesota. Also, Rastogi
and Nath [23] propose an algorithm based on Discrete Fourier
Transform to privately release aggregate time-series, while
Acs and Castelluccia [1] improve on [23] and present a
differentially private scheme tailored to the spatio-temporal
density of Paris. Finally, To et al. [32] release the entropy of
certain locations with DP guarantees, and show how to achieve
better utility although with weaker privacy notions.
Location privacy. Previous location privacy research taking
into account traces or profiles of single users [7, 12, 16,
24, 28, 37] does not apply to our problem, which focuses
on aggregate location statistics. Closer to our work is our
own PETS’17 paper [22], which shows that aggregate location
time-series can be used by an adversary to improve her prior
knowledge about users’ location profiles. Also, Xu et al. [36]
present an attack that exploits the uniqueness and the regularity
of human mobility, and extracts location trajectories from
aggregate mobility data. As opposed to these efforts, which
attempt to learn data about individuals (e.g., mobility profiles,
trajectories) from the aggregates, we focus on inferring their
membership to datasets, which, to the best of our knowledge,
has not been studied before.
III. DEFINING MEMBERSHIP INFERENCE ON
AGGREGATE LOCATIONS
In this section, we formalize the problem of membership
inference on aggregate location time-series. We consider the
case where one or more entities periodically release the number
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Symbol Description
Adv, Ch Adversary, Challenger
P Adv’s prior knowledge
U Set of mobile users
S Set of locations (ROIs)
T Time period considered
TO Observation period
TI Inference period
Lu User u’s location time-series, where
Lu[s, t] = 1 if u is in s at time t, 0 otherwise
L Location time-series of all users in U
Υ ⊂$ U Random subset Υ ⊂ U
AX Aggregate location time-series of users in X ⊂ U
where AX [s, t] =
∑
j∈X Lj [s, t]
m Variable representing size of aggregation group
TABLE I: Notation.
of users in some Regions Of Interest (ROIs), within a given
time interval (e.g., 99 taxis in Union Square on Fri, Aug
11th between 9–10am). By relying on this data, as well as
some prior knowledge, an adversary tries to infer if a target
individual contributed to the aggregates, i.e., whether or not
she is a member of the group yielding the released aggregates.
A. Notation
The notation used throughout the paper is summarized
in Table I. We denote the set of all users as U =
{u1, u2, · · · , u|U |}, and the set of regions of interest as S =
{s1, s2, · · · , s|S|}. We also use T = {t1, t2, · · · , t|T |} to
denote the set of time intervals on which aggregate locations
are collected, although, without loss of generality, the problem
can be extended to infinite intervals. We model the location of
a user u ∈ U over time as a binary matrix Lu of size |S|×|T |,
where Lu[s, t] is 1 if u is in location s ∈ S, at time t ∈ T ,
and 0 otherwise. That is, Lu contains the location time-series
of u, while those of all users are stored in a matrix L, which
is of size |U | × |S| × |T |.
Also, AX denotes the aggregate location time-series over
the users in X ⊂ U . AX is modeled as a matrix of size |S| ×
|T |, where each element AX [s, t] represents the number of
users in X that are in ROI s at time t.
Finally, we denote the prior knowledge of an adversary
(Adv) about users as P , which is built during an observation
period, denoted as TO ⊂ T (see Section IV-A). The prior
knowledge is used by Adv to perform membership inference
during the inference period, denoted as TI ⊂ T , for which
aggregates are available.
B. Membership Inference as a Distinguishability Game
We model membership inference by means of a distin-
guishability game (DG), played by the adversary Adv and a
challenger Ch, which generates the location aggregates over
various user groups. The former, having some prior knowledge
about the users (P), tries to infer whether data of a particular
user (u∗) is included in the aggregates. Naturally, Adv could
be interested in multiple target users, however, to ease presen-
tation, we describe the case of a single target user.
The game is parameterized by the set of users U , the
number of users included in the aggregation group (m), and
Game Parameters: (U,m, TI)
Adv(P) Ch(L)
Pick u∗ ∈ U u∗ //
Υ ⊂$ U \ {u∗} of size m− 1
b←$ {0, 1}
If b == 0:
U0 := Υ ∪ {u∗}
If b == 1:
u←$U \ {u∗} \Υ
U1 := Υ ∪ {u}
∀s ∈ S, ∀t ∈ TI ,
AUb [s, t] :=
∑
j∈Ub Lj [s, t]AUboo
b′ ← d(u∗, AUb ,m, TI ,P)
Output b′ ∈ {0, 1}
Fig. 1: Distinguishability Game (DG) between adversary Adv and
challenger Ch, capturing membership inference over aggregate loca-
tion time-series. The game is parameterized by the set of users (U ),
the aggregation group size (m) and the inference period (TI ).
the inference period TI . Note that m and TI inherently
affect Adv’s performance, as we discuss in our experimental
evaluation (Section VI).
We present the game in Fig. 1. First, Adv selects the target
user u∗ and sends it to Ch. The latter randomly selects a subset
Υ ⊂ U of size m− 1, excluding u∗, and draws a random bit
b. If b = 0, she aggregates the location matrices of all users
in Υ along with that of u∗; whereas, if b = 1, she selects
another random user u 6= u∗ not in Υ and adds her data to
the aggregates instead. The resulting matrix AUb , computed
over all timeslots of TI , is sent back to Adv, which attempts to
guess b. Adv wins if b′ = b, i.e., she successfully distinguishes
whether u∗ is part of the aggregates or not; naturally, her goal
is to win the game, over multiple iterations, with probability
higher than 1/2 (i.e., a random guess).
We model Adv’s guess as a distinguishing function, d, with
input (u∗, AUb ,m, TI ,P). How to instantiate the function is
discussed in Section IV-B. Observe that the parameters of the
DG game include the set of users U , but this information is not
used in the distinguishing function. In other words, we only
assume that Adv knows that u∗ is in the universe of possible
users, but not that she knows all users in U .
IV. METHODOLOGY
We now introduce our methodology to evaluate member-
ship inference on aggregate location time-series, modeled by
the DG game in Fig. 1. Specifically, we discuss ways to build
Adv’s prior knowledge (P) during the observation period TO,
how to instantiate the distinguishing function (i.e., deciding
the bit b′), and measure the performance of the inference.
A. Adversarial Knowledge
Our generic game-based definition of the adversarial goal
enables the consideration of adversaries of variable strength,
modeled by their prior knowledge, P . We consider two possi-
ble priors, discussed next.
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(1) Subset of Locations. We start with a setting in which Adv
knows the real locations of a subset of users Y ⊂ U , including
the target user (i.e., u∗ ∈ Y ), during the inference period TI .
Thus, in this case observation and inference periods coincide
(i.e., TO = TI ). We consider |Y | = α · |U |, where α ∈ [0, 1]
models the percentage of users for which Adv knows their
actual location. Formally, we define it as:
P : Lu[s, t] ∀u ∈ Y ∀s ∈ S ∀t ∈ TI (1)
This prior knowledge represents the case of an adversary
that has access to location information of some users at a point
in time, e.g., a telecommunications service provider getting
locations from cell towers, or a mobile app provider collecting
location data. Using this information she attempts to infer
membership of her target to an aggregate dataset published
by another entity.
(2) Participation in Past Groups. We then consider an
adversary that knows aggregates computed during an obser-
vation period TO, disjoint from the inference period TI (i.e.,
TO ∩ TI = ∅) for β groups Wi of size m, which may or
may not include u∗. For each group Wi, we assume that
Adv knows: (i) the aggregates of the observation period, i.e.,
AWi [s, t],∀s ∈ S and t ∈ TO, and (ii) u∗’s membership to the
group. More formally:
P : AWi ∧ 1Wi(u∗) ∀ i ∈ {1, · · · , β} (2)
where 1Wi(u
∗) is the indicator function modeling the mem-
bership of the target user to the group Wi. In our experiments,
we consider two different “flavors” of this prior:
– (2a) Same Groups as Released, Adv knows the target
user’s participation in past groups which are also used
to compute the aggregates released by Ch during the
inference period;
– (2b) Different Groups than Released, Adv knows the
user’s participation in past groups that are not used to
compute aggregates released in the inference period.
Observe that (2a) simulates the case of continuous data release
related to particular groups, where users are stable over time
(e.g., statistics about a neighborhood), and with the adversary
(e.g., a group member) having observed the participation of the
target user in past aggregates of the same groups. Prior (2b)
is less restrictive, as it only assumes that the adversary has
some aggregates of groups in which the target was previously
included, but does not require these groups to be fixed over
time – e.g., if the target user moves to a new neighborhood
and her data is mixed with other users, Adv attempts to infer
membership using past information.
B. Distinguishing Function
Recall from Section III that, in the DG game (Fig. 1), the
adversary tries to guess whether or not the target user is part
of the aggregates using a distinguishing function, which we
denoted as d. This function takes as input the target user u∗,
the “challenge” AUb , parameters of the game m and TI , and
the prior knowledge P .
We opt to instantiate d with a supervised machine learning
classifier, trained using data included in the adversarial prior
knowledge. Our intuition is that the adversary’s distinguishing
goal can be modeled as a binary classification task, i.e.,
categorizing observations into two classes corresponding to
whether or not the data of target user u∗ is part of the location
aggregates under examination.
C. Privacy Metric
Given our game-based definition, we reason about privacy
leakage in terms of the adversarial performance in distinguish-
ing whether or not u∗’s data is included in the aggregates.
In particular, we introduce a privacy loss metric, capturing
Adv’s advantage in winning the DG game over a random guess
(assuming that the adversary plays the distinguishability game
for a specific user multiple times), while relying on the Area
Under the Curve (AUC) to measure Adv’s performance.
AUC Score. For a series of instances of the game for u∗, we
count the Adv’s guesses b′ regarding the presence of u∗’s data
in the released aggregate location time-series as:
– True Positive (TP) when b = 0 and b′ = 0;
– True Negative (TN) when b = 1 and b′ = 1;
– False Positive (FP) when b = 1 and b′ = 0;
– False Negative (FN) when b = 0 and b′ = 1.
We then calculate True Positive and False Positive Rates, as
TPR = TP/(TP+FN) and FPR = FP/(FP+TN), respectively.
From these, we derive the Receiver Operating Characteristic
(ROC) curve, which represents the TPR and FPR obtained at
various discrimination classification thresholds, and compute
the Area Under Curve (AUC). The AUC captures a classifier’s
overall performance in the distinguishability game.
Privacy Loss (PL). As mentioned, we measure the privacy
loss of u∗ as the adversary’s improvement over a random guess
baseline (AUC = 0.5). Formally, we define PL as:
PL =
{AUC−0.5
0.5 if AUC > 0.5
0 otherwise
(3)
Hence, PL is a value between 0 and 1 that captures the ad-
versary’s advantage over random guessing when distinguishing
whether the target user’s data is part of the aggregates.
V. EXPERIMENT DESIGN
In this section, we present our experimental setup as well
as the datasets used in our evaluation. (Results are given later
in Sections VI and VII).
A. Datasets
We use two real-world datasets that capture different mo-
bility characteristics, obtained, respectively, from the Transport
for London (TFL) authority and the San Francisco Cab (SFC)
network. Both datasets contain about one month of location
data, and have been used often in ubiquitous computing [5, 29]
and location privacy [22, 27] research. We choose these
datasets primarily because of their different characteristics:
data from public transport (TFL) includes more users and is
more “predictable” (due to commuting patterns) than the SFC
dataset, which, on the other hand, is less sparse (i.e., it involves
more data points per user per day).
Transport For London (TFL). The TFL dataset consists of
trips made by passengers on the TFL network in March 2010
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using the Oyster Card – an RFID pre-paid card. Each record in
the data describes a unique trip and includes the (anonymized)
oyster card id, start time, touch-in station id, end time, and
touch-out station id. We discard trips from March 29–31 to
have exactly four weeks of data, which contain 60M trips made
by 4M unique Oyster cards, visiting 582 train/tube stations. We
select the top 10K oyster ids per total number of trips, which
account for about 6M trips. Considering oyster trips start/end
stations as ROIs, the top 10K users report, on average, 728
± 16 ROIs in total, out of which 20 ± 9 are unique. Setting
the time granularity to one hour, the top 10K oysters are in
the “system” for 115 ± 21 out of the 672 slots (28 days).
We consider each Oyster card as a user u, and compute the
matrix Lu setting Lu[s, t] to 1 if the user u touched-in or out
at station s, during time slot t ∈ T , and 0 otherwise. When a
card does not report any station at a particular time slot, we
assign it to a special ROI denoted as null. For this dataset, Lu
is a matrix of size |S| × |T | = 583× 672.
San Francisco Cabs (SFC). This dataset includes mobility
traces recorded by San Francisco taxis from May 17 to
June 10, 2008 [20]. Each record consists of a cab identifier,
latitude, longitude, and a time stamp. The dataset includes
approximately 11 million GPS coordinates generated by 536
taxis. We select 3 weeks (Monday May 19 to Sunday June
8) worth of data and discard traces outside downtown San
Francisco (i.e., those of 2 taxis). To generate ROIs, we split
the city into a 10 × 10 grid, whose cells are 0.18 sq. miles.
Setting the time granularity to one hour, the 534 cabs report
over 2M ROIs, on average 3,827 ± 1,069 locations per taxi, out
of which 78 ± 6 ROIs are unique. The SFC data is less sparse
than the TFL one, as cabs report locations more frequently
– specifically 340 ± 94 out of the 504 time slots in the 21
considered days. For each cab u, we populate Lu by setting
Lu[s, t] to 1 if u was in the s cell at time t ∈ T , and 0
otherwise. If a cab does not report any location, we assign it
to the special null ROI. For this dataset Lu is a matrix of size
|S| × |T | = 101× 504.
Sampling Users. For both datasets, we perform a basic
analysis of the number of ROIs reported by their users. We
observe that for TFL (resp., SFC), the median is 727 (resp.,
4,111), with a maximum of 881 (resp., 8,136) and a minimum
of 673 (resp., 504). We sort the users in each dataset per total
number of ROI reports and split them in 3 groups of equal
size, capturing their mobility patterns as: highly, mildly, and
somewhat mobile. To avoid bias, to select target users, we
sample 50 users from each mobility group at random. Thus,
we run membership inference attacks against a total 150 users
for each dataset.
B. Experimental Setup
Our experiments aim to evaluate the effectiveness of the
distinguishing function d, used in the DG game, to guess
whether the target user u∗ is in the aggregates or not. As
mentioned, we instantiate d using a machine learning classifier.
We train the classifier on a balanced dataset of labeled ag-
gregates over user groups that include and groups that exclude
u∗, so that it learns patterns that distinguish its participation
in the aggregates. The training dataset is generated using data
from the prior knowledge P . We then play the game, i.e., we
use the trained classifier to infer membership on a balanced
testing set of aggregates previously unseen.
More specifically, we go through three phases: aggregation,
feature extraction, and classification, which we describe in
high-level. The concrete details of each phase depend on the
adversarial prior knowledge, as we discuss later in Section VI
(where we evaluate membership inference attacks with differ-
ent priors). The three phases are discussed next.
Aggregation. We create a dataset D by repeating these steps:
1) Randomly generate a group U0 of m users, which in-
cludes u∗;
2) Aggregate the location matrices of users in U0, for |TI |
intervals;
3) Append a row with the aggregates AU0 to dataset D, and
attach the label in;
4) Randomly generate a group U1 of m users, which ex-
cludes u∗;
5) Aggregate the location matrices of users in U1, for |TI |
intervals;
6) Append a row with the aggregates AU1 to the dataset D,
and attach the label out.
Feature Extraction. For each row of the dataset, corresponding
to the aggregates of a group with/without u∗, we extract statis-
tics that are given as input to the classifier. Such statistics are
calculated per location (ROI) and include variance, minimum,
maximum, median, mean, standard deviation, as well as the
sum of values of each location’s time-series.
Classification. We first split the dataset D into the non-
overlapping balanced training and testing sets mentioned
above. We then train the classifier on the features extracted
from the training set. Finally, we play the distinguishability
game on the aggregates of the testing set (data previously
unseen by the classifier), classifying them as including or
excluding u∗.
Implementation. Our experiments are implemented in Python
using the scikit-learn machine learning suite.1 Source code is
available upon request. We instantiate the following classifiers:
i) Logistic Regression (LR), for which we employ a linear
solver using a coordinate descent optimization algorithm suit-
able for binary classification [11]; ii) Nearest Neighbors (k-
NN), configured to use Euclidean distance, with k set to 5,
i.e., to predict the output class based on the votes of the 5
nearest samples; iii) Random Forests (RF), set up to train 30
decision trees and to consider all the features during the node
splits using the Gini criterion to measure their quality; and iv)
Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP), consisting of 1 hidden layer
with 200 nodes, whose weights are calculated via a stochastic
gradient-based optimizer. For more details about the classifiers,
we refer to Appendix A.
For the feature extraction, we use the tsfresh Python
package.2 For both datasets, and for all groups, we extract
the 7 statistical features mentioned above, for each ROI. We
obtain 4081 features for TFL (583 ROIs) and 707 features
for SFC (101 ROIs). To avoid overfitting, we use Recursive
1http://scikit-learn.org/stable/
2http://tsfresh.readthedocs.io/en/latest/
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Feature Elimination (RFE) to reduce the number of features to
the number of samples we create for each user’s dataset D. We
then feed the features in their original form to all classifiers,
except for MLP where we standardize them to have mean of
0 and variance 1.
VI. EVALUATING MEMBERSHIP INFERENCE ON RAW
AGGREGATE LOCATIONS
We now present the results of our experimental evaluation,
measuring the performance of different classifiers in instanti-
ating the distinguishing function (i.e., performing membership
inference) on raw aggregates. We do so vis-a`-vis the differ-
ent priors discussed in Section IV-A, using the experimental
methodology and the datasets described above. Recall that, in
each experiment, we perform attacks against 150 users sampled
from high, mild, and somewhat mobility profiles (50 each).
A. Subset of Locations
We start with the setting where the observation and infer-
ence periods coincide, and the adversary knows the time-series
for a subset of users, including the target, during this period.
This information can then be used by Adv to create groups,
with and without her target, and train a classifier. We consider,
as the observation/inference period, the first week of both TFL
and SFC datasets – that is, |TO| = |TI | = 24 · 7 = 168
hourly timeslots. We build Adv’s prior by setting α = 0.11
for TFL and α = 0.2 for SFC, i.e, we randomly choose 1,100
out of 10,000 TFL users and 106 out of 534 SFC cabs. This
represents a setting where Adv (e.g., a telecommunications
service provider) knows location information for a small subset
of users, including her target.
We then generate (i) a balanced training dataset by ran-
domly sampling 400 unique user groups from Adv’s prior
knowledge, whereby half include the target user and half ex-
clude it; and (ii) a balanced testing set by sampling 100 unique
user groups from the set of users not in the prior knowledge
(apart from the target user). Our choice for training/testing
sizes (400 and 100, resp.) is so that the datasets are large
enough to enable learning and evaluation, and experiments
run in reasonable time. Finally, we extract features from the
aggregates of both training and testing groups, labeling them
as per the participation of the target in the group, and perform
experiments with different values of m in order to evaluate the
effect of aggregation group size.
TFL Dataset. Fig. 2 plots the CDF, computed over the 150
target TFL users, of the AUC score achieved by the classifiers
for different values of m. Limited by the adversarial knowledge
(1,100 users), we examine aggregation group sizes up to 1,000.
Note that the orange line labeled as ‘BEST’ represents a
hypothetical best case in which Adv chooses the classifier that
yields the highest AUC score for each target user.
When groups are small, i.e., m = 5 or 10, all classifiers
achieve very high AUC scores. For instance, with m = 10,
Linear Regression (LR) and Random Forest (RF) achieve a
mean AUC score of 0.97 and 0.99, respectively. This indicates
that for such small groups, where users’ contribution to the
aggregates is very significant, membership inference is very
effective. As the size of the aggregation groups increases to
m = 50 or 100, the performance only slightly decreases, with
RF outperforming LR, Nearest Neighbors (k-NN), and Multi-
Layer Perceptron (MLP), yielding 0.94 mean AUC for groups
of 50 users, and 0.83 for 100. With larger aggregation sizes,
m = 500 or 1,000, performance drops closer to the random
guess baseline (AUC = 0.5). Nonetheless, even for groups of
1,000 users, Adv can still infer membership of 60% of the
target population with an AUC score higher than 0.6.
We also measure the impact of the effectiveness of the
distinguishing function on privacy using the Privacy Loss
metric (PL, cf. Eq. 3). More specifically, in Fig. 3a, we report
a box-plot with the PL for different aggregation group sizes,
when the adversary picks the best classifier for each target
user (orange line in Fig. 2). For small groups, mean PL is
very large, e.g., 0.99 for m = 10, 0.89 for 50, and 0.68 for
100. Unsurprisingly, PL decreases as the group size increases,
i.e., users enjoy better privacy when their data is aggregated in
larger groups. Yet, even then they experience a 25% reduction
of privacy vs a random guess (m = 1,000).
SFC Dataset. In Fig. 4, we plot the classifiers’ performance
on the SFC dataset for groups of up to 100 users, as we are
limited by the adversarial knowledge (106 cabs). As in the
previous case, for small groups (m = 5, 10) Adv can infer
membership with high accuracy. For instance, for groups of
10 users, LR and MLP achieve mean AUC of 0.9, followed
by RF (0.84) and k-NN (0.7). Again, performance decreases as
group size increases: for groups of 50 cabs (resp., 100) MLP
and LR yield mean AUC scores of 0.72 (resp., 0.68) and 0.7
(resp., 0.67). Nonetheless, when Adv picks the best classifier
for each cab (orange line), mean AUC score is still 0.72 even
with 100 users per group.
PL over the different values of m is explored in Fig. 3b,
using the best classifier for each target. Similar to the TFL
case, the loss is very large for small groups (e.g., PL = 0.86
when m = 10), and remains significant in larger ones (e.g.,
PL = 0.44 when m = 100). Interestingly, for groups up to
100 users, PL is larger on TFL than on SFC data (e.g., PL =
0.68 on TFL vs 0.44 on SFC, for m = 100), indicating that
membership inference is easier on sparse data.
B. Participation in Past Groups
Next, we simulate the setting where Adv’s prior knowledge
consists of aggregates of groups released in a past observation
period, labeled as including data from the target user or not.
As discussed in Section IV-A, we consider two variants: when
Adv’s prior knowledge is built on either (a) the same groups as
or (b) different groups than those used to compute the inference
period aggregates.
Same Groups as Released. In this setting, we generate D
by computing the aggregates of β = 150 randomly sampled
unique user groups – 75 that include and 75 that exclude the
target – and set the corresponding label of participation. We
split D over time to obtain the training and testing sets. As
observation period, i.e., where Adv builds her prior knowledge,
we consider the first 3 weeks for TFL (i.e., |TO| = 3 · 168 =
504 hourly timeslots) and the first 2 weeks for SFC (|TO| =
336). In both cases, the inference period is the last week of
data, thus |TI | = 168 hourly timeslots, yielding a 75%-25%
split for TFL, and a 67%-33% split for SFC. Finally, we train
the classifiers with features extracted from the aggregates of
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Fig. 2: Subset of Locations prior (TFL, α = 0.11, |TI | = 168) – Adv’s performance for different values of m.
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(a) TFL (α = 0.11, |TI | = 168)
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(b) SFC (α = 0.2, |TI | = 168)
Fig. 3: Subset of Locations prior - Privacy Loss (PL) for different values of m.
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Fig. 4: Subset of Locations prior (SFC, α = 0.2, |TI | = 168) – Adv’s performance for different values of m.
each week in the training set, and test them on those extracted
from the aggregates of each group in the test set.
TFL Dataset. Fig. 5 shows the classifiers’ performance for
different aggregation group sizes (m). In this experiment, there
is no limitation from the prior, thus we can consider groups
as large as the dataset. As expected, we observe that for
group sizes up to 100 (Figs. 5a–5d), membership inference
is very accurate (all classifiers yield mean AUC scores over
0.9). Interestingly, as the groups grow to 1,000 commuters
(Fig. 5e), LR, RF and MLP still yield very high AUC scores
(0.99 on average), while k-NN slightly decreases (0.86). For
groups of 9,500 commuters (Fig. 5f), MLP clearly outperforms
the other classifiers yielding an AUC score of 0.99 compared
to 0.81 for LR, 0.62 for k-NN and 0.61 for RF. Overall, this
experiment indicates that when mobility patterns are regular,
as the ones of commuters, an adversary with prior knowledge
about specific groups can successfully infer membership in the
future if groups are maintained, even if they are large.
Fig. 6a reports the privacy loss (PL) when the adversary
picks the best classifier for each user. We see that, inde-
pendently of the group size, commuters lose a huge amount
of privacy when they are aggregated in groups for which
the adversary has prior knowledge. The results reinforce the
previous intuition: the effect of regularity on aggregates is very
strong, and makes commuters very susceptible to membership
inference attacks.
SFC Dataset. Fig. 7 illustrates the performance of the classi-
fiers for variable aggregation group size on the SFC dataset.
Recall that this is smaller than TFL, as it only contains
534 cabs. We observe that the lack of regularity in cabs
movement has a great impact on the ability of an adversary
to infer membership, even when the groups are maintained
over time. For small groups (m = 5 or 10), the classifiers’
AUC ranges between 0.76 and 0.64, as opposed to 0.9 or
more in TFL, with MLP now yielding the best results. As
groups become larger (Figs. 7c–7e), irregularity has a bigger
effect and, unexpectedly, performance drops further. Already
for m = 100, RF and k-NN perform similar to the random
guess baseline, and LR’s AUC drops to 0.52 when group size
reaches m = 500. MLP, however, is still somewhat better
7
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Area Under Curve (AUC)
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
C
D
F
-
O
ys
te
rs
LR
k-NN
RF
MLP
BEST
(a) m = 5
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Area Under Curve (AUC)
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
C
D
F
-
O
ys
te
rs
(b) m = 10
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Area Under Curve (AUC)
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
C
D
F
-
O
ys
te
rs
(c) m = 50
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Area Under Curve (AUC)
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
C
D
F
-
O
ys
te
rs
(d) m = 100
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Area Under Curve (AUC)
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
C
D
F
-
O
ys
te
rs
(e) m = 1, 000
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Area Under Curve (AUC)
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
C
D
F
-
O
ys
te
rs
(f) m = 9, 500
Fig. 5: Same Groups as Released prior (TFL, 75%-25% split, β = 150, |TI | = 168) – Adv’s performance for different values of m.
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(a) TFL, 75%− 25% split, β = 150, |TI | = 168
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(b) SFC, 67%− 33% split, β = 150, |TI | = 168
Fig. 6: Same Groups as Released prior - Privacy Loss (PL) for different values of m.
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Fig. 7: Same Groups as Released prior (SFC, 67%-33% split, β = 150, |TI | = 168) – Adv’s performance for different values of m.
than random (0.57 mean AUC). Overall, if the adversary picks
the best classifier for each cab (orange line), she can infer
membership for half the cabs with AUC score larger than 0.6.
In terms of PL, Fig. 6b shows that cabs lose privacy when
they are aggregated in small groups. However, since cabs, as
well as the groups they are aggregated in, are not as regular
as TFL commuters, the loss drops drastically with larger
groups (e.g., mean PL is 0.2 for groups of 500 cabs). In other
words, irregularity makes inferring membership harder for the
adversary. However, even though on average PL decreases, we
observe that, for m = 500, some instances of our experiment
exhibit larger privacy loss than for m = 300. This stems from
the small size of the cab population. As there are only 534
cabs, when grouping them in batches of 500 elements, there
inevitably is a big overlap across groups, which effectively
creates a somewhat “artificial” regularity that increases the
performance of the attack.
Different Groups than Released. In this setting, for each
target user, we design a balanced experiment by generating
a dataset D with the aggregates of 400 unique randomly
sampled groups – half including the target and half not – and
set the corresponding participation label (in/out). Once again,
the experiment size is chosen to provide enough data for our
classifiers to learn patterns, while keeping the computation
time reasonable on commodity hardware. To simulate the
difference in groups between observation and inference period,
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Fig. 8: Different Groups than Released prior (TFL, 75%-25% split, β=300, |TI |=168) – Adv’s performance for different values of m.
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(a) TFL, 75%− 25% split, β = 300, |TI | = 168
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(b) SFC 67%− 33% split, β = 300, |TI | = 168
Fig. 9: Different Groups than Released prior - Privacy Loss (PL) for different values of m.
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Fig. 10: Different Groups than Released prior (SFC 67%-33% split, β=300, |TI |=168) – Adv’s performance for different values of m.
we first perform a 75%-25% stratified random split of D,
whereby we keep 300 groups for training and 100 for testing.
Then, for TFL, we define the observation period to be the
first 3 weeks of data (i.e., |TO| = 504) while for SFC the
first 2 weeks (|TO| = 336) and in both cases, the inference
period is the last week (i.e., |TI | = 168). We then split the
training and testing sets according to time: from the training
set, we keep only the aggregates of the observation period,
while, from the testing set, only those from the inference period
(i.e., overall, we perform a 75%-25% split for TFL and 67%-
33% for SFC). That is, we let the adversary obtain knowledge
for 300 user groups (i.e., β = 300), half including her target,
whose aggregates are generated during the observation period.
Finally, we train the classifiers on the features extracted from
the aggregates of the groups in the training set for each week
of the observation period, and test them against those extracted
from the groups in the testing set (during the inference period).
TFL Dataset. Fig. 8 illustrates the classifiers’ performance
for different aggregation group sizes (up to 9,500 commuters,
since there are no restrictions). Once again, for small groups
(m = 5 or 10) membership can be easily inferred (AUC
> 0.89 for all classifiers). As m starts increasing, we first
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(d) SFC (67%-33% split, m = 100)
Fig. 11: Same Groups as Released prior (β=150) - Adv’s performance for variable inference period length (|TI |), on (a) TFL and (b) SFC,
and Privacy Loss on (c) TFL and (d) SFC.
observe a small drop in the adversarial performance, with RF
achieving mean AUC of 0.89 and 0.78 for groups of 50 and
100 commuters, resp. This indicates that regularity still helps
membership inference in small groups even when these groups
change. However, when m reaches 1,000 all the classifiers
perform, on average, similar to the baseline indicating that the
effect of regularity dilutes. Interestingly, for m = 9,500, we
note a small increase in the classifiers’ AUC scores due to
the big user overlap across training and testing groups, i.e.,
the different-groups prior becomes more similar to the same-
groups prior.
This effect can also be observed in terms of PL (Fig. 9a).
Membership inference is quite effective for groups of size
up to 100, where commuters suffer a privacy loss of at least
0.59. However, when data of more commuters is aggregated,
mean PL decreases to 0.17 for groups of 1,000, and it slightly
increases to 0.22 when m = 9,500. Overall, we note that the
privacy loss is smaller in this setting, however, this is not
surprising, since this is a much weaker adversarial setting than
the previous ones.
SFC Dataset. Similar to the experiment with the same groups
prior, we observe in Fig. 10 that the classifiers perform worse
for SFC than TFL, due to the lack of regularity. Already
for small groups (m = 5) the mean AUC drops to 0.71
for the best classifiers, LR and MLP. With larger groups, the
performance is significantly lower, and all classifiers converge
towards the random guess baseline. When m = 500, MLP
and LR yield slightly better results and membership inference
can be achieved with AUC larger than 0.6 for only a small
percentage of cabs (about 20%).
From Fig. 9b, we see that, due to the weaker prior, PL
values are smaller across the board compared to the previous
setting. Overall, PL decreases with increasing aggregation
group size, ranging from mean PL of 0.54 with m = 5 to 0.12
for m = 300. Similar to the TFL case, we observe a small
increase for groups of 500 cabs. The reason is the same, i.e.,
the user overlaps between training and testing groups slightly
improve the effectiveness of the membership inference attack.
C. Length of Inference Period
In the previous experiments, we have studied the effect
of the size of the aggregation groups (m) on the success of
membership inference, for various types of adversarial prior
knowledge. In this section, we examine the effect of the
inference period length, i.e., |TI |. We consider lengths of 1
week (168 hourly timeslots), 1 day (24 timeslots), and 8 hours
(8 timeslots). In particular, for the last two, we also consider
working vs weekend days to account for the difference in
mobility behavior.
Due to space limitations, we only report experiments in the
setting where Adv has prior knowledge about the exact groups
that are released by Ch – i.e., prior (2a) in Section IV-A – and
fix the group size to 1,000 commuters for TFL and to 100
cabs for SFC. For each target user, we create a dataset of β =
150 random unique groups, half of which include the user and
half of which do not, and split their aggregates in training and
testing sets according to time following a 75%-25% split for
TFL and a 67%-33% for SFC. We choose RF as classifier
for TFL, and MLP for SFC, since they yield the best AUC
scores in this setting, as shown in Figs. 5e and 7d. For each
|TI | ∈ {8, 24, 168}, we train the classifiers on aggregates of
that length, for each week in the training set (observation pe-
riod), and evaluate them against the corresponding aggregates
in the test set (inference period).
Fig. 11a reports the results on the TFL dataset: as the
number of points in the inference period |TI | decreases, the
adversarial performance degrades as there is less information
about mobility patterns to be exploited. Also, there is indeed
a difference between working days and weekends. Mean AUC
is 0.97 when training and testing on a Monday, and 0.8 on a
Saturday. This seems to be due to regularity, as commuters’
regular patterns during the week make them more susceptible
to membership inference than sporadic/leisure activities over
weekends. This is confirmed by the classifier’s performance for
10
|TI | = 8, as we obtain much better results when the inference
period is set to Monday 8am–4pm (AUC = 0.91) than on
Saturday during the same timeframe (AUC = 0.72).
Once again, the lack of regularity affects negatively Adv’s
performance when attacking the SFC dataset (Fig. 11b). As for
the length of the inference period, our results confirm that the
inference task becomes harder with fewer points in time: mean
AUC drops from 0.62 to 0.54 when |TI | goes from 1 week to 1
day. However, as cabs are never regular (their movements are
mandated by client demand), we do not observe significant
difference between working days and weekends, nor when
considering full days vs 8h slots.
The Privacy Loss (PL) exhibits similar trends. For TFL (see
Fig. 11c), the highest loss is observed when more points are
available (0.98 on average when |TI | is 1 week), while the loss
is reduced as the length of the inference period decreases and
the adversary has less information. Also, we see how regularity
in working days results in better membership inference attacks
than during weekends, i.e., mean PL is 0.96 and 0.85 on
Mondays vs 0.61 and 0.46 on Saturdays for |TI | set at 24
and 8 hours, respectively. Finally, Fig. 11d highlights smaller
PL for the SFC cabs, for all period lengths, with a maximum
mean PL of 0.25 when |TI | is 1 week, down to 0.1 and 0.09
for 1 day and 8 hours, respectively. There is no significant
difference between Mondays and Saturdays, confirming that
regularity has a strong influence on the problem.
D. Raw Aggregates Evaluation – Take-Aways
Overall, our evaluation showcases the effectiveness of
modeling membership inference attacks on aggregate location
time-series as a classification task, vis-a`-vis different datasets
and priors. We show that an adversary can build a machine
learning model by extracting features from known aggregate
location time-series and use it to guess whether a target user
has contributed to a set of previously unseen aggregates. Our
results evidence that the risks stemming from such attacks are
significant, with the actual level of privacy leakage depending
on the adversary’s prior knowledge, the characteristics of the
data, as well as the group size and timeframe on which
aggregation is performed.
We find that, up to certain aggregation group sizes, mem-
bership inference is very successful when the adversary knows
the actual locations of a subset of users (including her target),
or when she knows past aggregates for the same groups on
which she tries to perform the inference. In the least restrictive
setting, where the past groups known to the adversary are
different than those whose statistics are released, privacy
leakage is relatively small, but still non-negligible.
Moreover, the characteristics of the data used for aggre-
gation also influence the adversarial performance: in general,
privacy leakage on the dataset containing mobility of com-
muters (TFL) is larger than on the one including cab traces
(SFC). This highlights that regularity in users’ movements, as
well as sparseness of the location signal, significantly ease the
membership inference task.
Finally, the number of users that contribute to aggregation
also has a profound effect on the adversarial performance.
Unsurprisingly, membership inference is very successful when
aggregation is performed over small groups, while users gener-
ally enjoy more privacy in larger groups. A notable exception
is the TFL case where, due to the regularity of commuters,
membership inference attacks are still very effective even for
large groups. Also, the length, as well as the time semantics,
of the inference period play a very important role. Inference
is easier if the aggregates of longer periods are released (i.e.,
more information is available to extract patterns), and at times
when mobility patterns are likely to be more regular (e.g.,
workdays or mornings).
VII. EVALUATING DP DEFENSES
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of available
defense mechanisms to prevent privacy leakage from member-
ship inference attacks on aggregate location time-series.
A. Differential Privacy (DP)
The established framework to define private functions that
are free from inferences is Differential Privacy (DP) [8].
Applying differentially private mechanisms to a dataset ensures
that only a bounded amount of information is disclosed upon
its release. This can mitigate membership inference attacks, as
DP’s indistinguishability-based definition guarantees that the
outcome of any computation on a dataset is insensitive to the
inclusion of any data record (user) in the dataset.
Formally, we say that a randomized algorithmM is (, δ)-
differentially private if for all datasets D1 and D2 that differ
on at most one element, and all S ⊆ Range(M):
Pr[M(D1) ∈ S] ≤ e × Pr[M(D2) ∈ S] + δ (4)
where the probability is calculated over the coin tosses of M
and Range(M) denotes the set of possible outcomes ofM. In
other words, the outcome of M has a very small dependence
on the members of the dataset. If δ = 0, we say that M is
-differentially private [8].
We also review the notion of sensitivity, which captures
how much one record affects the output of a function. For-
mally, for any function f : D → Rd, the sensitivity of f is:
∆fp = max
D1,D2
‖ f(D1)− f(D2) ‖p (5)
for all datasets D1, D2 differing on at most one element, with
‖ · ‖p indicating the `p norm.
Laplacian Mechanism (LPA): The most common used mecha-
nism to achieve DP is to randomize the aggregate statistics to
be released using random noise independently drawn from the
Laplace distribution. For a function f : D → Rd, a randomized
mechanism M defined as M(X) = f(X) + Lap(0, σ)d guar-
antees -DP if σ ≥ ∆f1 . A weaker version of LPA has been
proposed for time-series, which perturbs the counts of a time-
series with noise distributed according to Lap(1/) [6]. How-
ever, this mechanism only provides event-level privacy [10],
i.e., in our setting, it can only protect single location visits.
We include it as a baseline for our evaluation, since we do not
expect it to perform well for full time-series.
Gaussian Mechanism (GSM): Another mechanism consists in
perturbing the statistics with random noise drawn from the
Gaussian distribution N . Given f : D → Rd, a randomized
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mechanism M defined as M(X) = f(X) + N (0, σ2)d
provides (, δ)-DP when σ ≥
√
2·ln(2/δ)
 ·∆f2 [9]. Note that
this is a weaker privacy guarantee than the one offered by LPA.
Fourier Perturbation Algorithm (FPA): We then consider dif-
ferentially private mechanisms proposed specifically for time-
series settings. One is FPA [23], which performs the noise
addition on the compressed frequency domain: a time-series
is compressed using the Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT)
and the first κ Fourier coefficients Fκ are kept. Then Fκ is
perturbed with noise distributed according to Lap(
√
κ ·∆f2/)
and padded with zeros to the size of the original time-series.
Finally, the inverse DFT is applied to obtain the perturbed
time-series. As per [23], FPA provably guarantees -DP.
Enhanced Fourier Perturbation Algorithm with Gaussian
Noise (EFPAG): EFPAG [1] improves FPA by choosing the
number of coefficients (κ) to be perturbed probabilistically, and
using the exponential mechanism to assign larger probability to
values that minimize the root-sum-squared error between the
input time-series and its noisy version. Then, rather than DFT,
it uses the Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) and employs
Gaussian noise instead of Laplacian to achieve better accuracy.
As a result, EFPAG guarantees (, δ)-DP [1].
B. Experimental Design
Intuition. Our evaluation of membership inference on raw
aggregate location time-series showed that releasing them
poses a significant privacy threat for users whose times-series
are aggregated, and more so in settings where aggregation
is performed over small groups. In this section, we present
experiments aiming to evaluate the effectiveness of differen-
tially private mechanisms in defending against such inferences.
Note that we opt to evaluate them over large groups, since we
expect (and have also verified experimentally) that, for small
groups, the loss of utility incurred by DP-based mechanisms
is prohibitively high. This is because the sensitivity of the lo-
cation aggregation function, which directly affects the amount
of noise to be employed, does not depend on the group size
(m). As such, the aggregate time-series of groups with few
users, which naturally have small counts, are affected more by
the noise required by the DP-based mechanism.
As the large group size gives the defense mechanism an
“advantage” in terms of utility, and since DP provides protec-
tion against arbitrary risks [8], we set to run our experiments
considering a worst-case adversary that obtains perfect prior
knowledge for the users, i.e., she knows the inference period
aggregates of the groups that are released by the challenger as
well as the target user’s membership in these groups. With this
knowledge, Adv is able to train an accurate machine learning
classifier that, upon release of raw statistics, always guesses
correctly the target user’s membership – i.e., achieves an AUC
score of 1. In other words, we evaluate the privacy/utility trade-
off of differentially private mechanisms considering the best
setting for utility and the worst one for privacy.
Experiments. We slightly modify the DG game in Fig. 1,
such that Ch applies a differentially private mechanism on the
aggregates, before sending her challenge to Adv. We evaluate
the gain in privacy offered by the mechanisms on two cases,
depending on whether Adv’s classifier (which, once again,
instantiates the distinguishing function) is trained on (1) the
raw aggregates of the groups to be released; or (2) noisy
aggregates of the groups to be released using the defense
mechanism under examination.
In both cases, testing is done on the aggregates of the
released groups, perturbed with the defense mechanism (using
fresh noise). The first scenario represents a passive adversary
that attempts to infer user membership on the noisy aggregates,
exploiting only the raw aggregate information from her prior
knowledge. The second one, represents a strategic active ad-
versary that tries to mimic the behavior of the defender during
training, knowing the parameters of the defense mechanism
(i.e.,  and the sensitivity of the aggregation function denoted
as ∆), but not knowing the concrete values used in the
defender’s perturbation. We follow the same procedure as in
Section V, i.e., we extract features from the aggregate location
time-series of the user groups, and use RFE to reduce the
number of features to the number of samples.
Settings. We run membership inference attacks against the 150
users sampled from each dataset (cf. Section V-A). We take
as observation/inference period the first week in each dataset,
i.e. |TO| = |TI | = 168. Aiming to examine a favorable setting
for the utility of DP-based mechanisms, we construct large
user groups: we set m = 9,500 for TFL, and m = 500 for
SFC. Then, we generate the dataset D by randomly sampling
200 and 400 elements for TFL and SFC, respectively, half
including the target and half not. We pick a different number
of groups for practical reasons: the TFL dataset has six times
more ROIs than the SFC one, and this makes feature extraction
significantly more expensive. As classifier, we employ MLP,
which performed well overall in the previous experiments.
To configure the perturbation mechanisms, we calculate the
sensitivity ∆ for the users in each dataset (i.e., the maximum
number of ROIs reported by an oyster/cab in the inference
week), obtaining ∆ = 207 for TFL and ∆ = 2,685 for SFC.
We consider  values of DP in the range {0.01, 0.1, 1.0, 10.0},
and set δ = 0.1 for GSM and EFPAG. For FPA, we empirically
find the best value for κ in terms of utility, setting κ = 25 for
TFL, and κ = 20 for SFC.
Metrics. Our evaluation uses the following privacy and utility
metrics to capture the amount of privacy gained compared to
a setting where the DG game is played on raw aggregates, and
the utility lost due to the noise addition.
Privacy Gain (PG): We define PG as the relative decrease in
a classifier’s AUC score when tested on perturbed aggregates
(AUCA′ ) versus raw aggregates (AUCA):
PG =
{
AUCA−AUCA′
AUCA−0.5 if AUCA > AUCA′ ≥ 0.5
0 otherwise
(6)
PG is a value between 0 and 1, which captures the decrease
in adversarial performance, i.e., how much the adversary’s in-
ference power deteriorates towards the random guess baseline,
when a defense mechanism is implemented.
Mean Relative Error (MRE): We evaluate the utility loss as
a result of using DP-based defense mechanisms by means of
the standard MRE metric, computed between the raw aggregate
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 0.01 0.1 1.0 10
LPA(∆/) 3056.1 812.6 81.7 8.2
GSM 753.2 75.8 7.4 0.75
FPA 67.2 6.1 0.7 0.03
EFPAG 36.8 3.6 0.4 0.03
LPA(1 / ) 38.5 3.7 0.3 0.002
TABLE II: MRE of aggregate location time-series with different
differentially private mechanisms and parameter  (TFL).
time series Y , of length n, and its perturbed version Y ′:
MRE(Y, Y ′) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
|Y ′i − Yi|
max(γ, Yi)
(7)
where γ is a sanity bound mitigating the effect of very small
counts. Following previous work [1], we set γ to 0.1% of∑n
i=1 Yi. We compute the MRE over the aggregate time-series
for all ROIs (s ∈ S) in our datasets and report the mean value.
C. Results
Utility. We first report the utility measured as per the Mean
Relative Error (MRE) of the TFL and SFC perturbed ag-
gregates, for each mechanism and different values of , in
Tables II and III. Naturally, as  increases, so does utility.
Note that LPA(∆/) incurs the highest MRE, with the noisy
aggregate values being 8 (resp., 41) times less accurate than
raw aggregates on TFL (resp., SFC) data, in the most relaxed
privacy setting ( = 10). With GSM, utility does not improve
much. On the other hand, FPA and EFPAG achieve better
results, e.g., MRE is under 1.1 for values of  ≥ 1. Finally,
note that LPA(1/) achieves the best utility, but it provides
poor privacy protection against membership inference attacks,
as shown below.
Privacy. We now evaluate the Privacy Gain (PG) provided
by the different DP-based mechanisms, distinguishing between
the two settings introduced in Section VII-B.
Train on Raw / Test on Noisy Aggregates. Fig. 12 plots the
PG achieved by various mechanisms against a MLP classifier
trained on raw aggregates and tested on perturbed ones. For
TFL (Fig. 12a), we observe that for low  values (up to 0.1)
all mechanisms provide excellent privacy protection, achieving
Privacy Gain (PG) close to 1. However, this protection comes
with poor utility, as shown in Table II. As  increases to 1,
LPA(∆/) and GSM still provide good protection, while we
observe a small drop in PG for the mechanisms that achieve
MRE < 1. In particular, FPA now yields a mean PG of 0.9,
while EFPAG and LPA(1/) 0.75 and 0.38, resp. When  = 10
and the utility of FPA and EFPAG is good, the decrease in PG
is bigger (0.45 and 0.3, resp.), as expected.
With SFC data (Fig. 12b), we find that PG for all the
mechanisms stays high for values of  up to 1. This is
reasonable, since the sensitivity, and thus, the magnitude of
noise required, is much larger on SFC compared to TFL
(∆ = 2,685 vs 207). However, as seen from Table III, utility is
quite poor in these settings. With  = 10, mean PG is almost 1
for LPA(∆/) and GSM, i.e., users are well protected against
membership inference attacks. Meanwhile, PG slightly drops
for FPA and EFPAG (0.96 and 0.92 on average) while their
 0.01 0.1 1.0 10
LPA(∆/) 131.9 129.3 114.4 41.9
GSM 129.6 94.7 14.1 1.4
FPA 85.9 11.3 1.1 0.11
EFPAG 57.9 6.1 0.6 0.04
LPA(1 / ) 24.7 2.5 0.2 0.001
TABLE III: MRE of aggregate location time-series with different
differentially private mechanisms and parameter  (SFC).
utility is higher. Unsurprisingly, LPA(1/) achieves negligible
privacy gain in this setting.
Train on Noisy / Test on Noisy Aggregates. Fig. 13 reports
the PG results when the MLP classifier is trained on noisy
aggregates. Interestingly, the protection of the mechanisms
decreases much faster for increasing values of . For TFL
(Fig. 13a), we observe that for values of  ≤ 1, the PG
decreases only slightly compared to the previous setting, where
training was done on raw aggregates (Fig. 12a). That is, the
DP-based mechanisms still provide good protection against
membership inference. However, when  = 10, we notice a
notable decrease in PG, with FPA and EFPAG. More precisely,
FPA now achieves 0.2 mean PG (vs 0.45 in the previous
setting) and EFPAG provides negligible protection against
membership inference (compared to 0.3 in Fig. 12a,  = 10).
Similarly, with SFC (Fig. 13b), mean PG remains high for
 ≤ 1 for all mechanisms, except for LPA(1/). For  = 10,
there is a significant decline in PG with GSM, FPA, and
EFPAG. In particular, GSM now yields 0.8 mean PG, while
FPA and EFPAG 0.32 and 0.15, respectively. This corresponds
to a significant drop in privacy protection (20%, 66% and 83%
for GSM, FPA, and EFPAG) compared to the setting where
training was done on raw aggregates (cf. Fig. 12b).
D. DP Evaluation – Take-Aways
The experiments presented in this section evaluate the
performance of differentially private mechanisms against mem-
bership inference on aggregate location time-series, both in
terms of privacy and utility. Considering an advantageous
setting for utility, but worst-case for privacy, we find that
differentially private mechanisms can be effective at preventing
inferences, but with some important caveats. In particular, our
results show that a passive adversary who trains a classifier
on raw aggregate location data is not very successful at
inferring membership on noisy aggregates. However, when
we consider a strategic adversary that mimics the behavior
of the defender, and trains a classifier on noisy aggregates, we
find that the actual privacy gain offered from the DP-based
mechanisms is significantly reduced, and also decreases much
faster with increasing  values. This should draw the attention
of the research community as advances in deep learning, might
lead to stronger attacks against defense mechanisms based on
perturbation (e.g., by achieving noise filtering).
Among the defense mechanisms considered, we observe
that the straightforward application of LPA and GSM yields
very poor utility. This is not surprising, as previous work
highlights the difficulty of releasing private statistics under
continual observation [6, 10, 17]. Mechanisms specifically
proposed for time-series settings (i.e., FPA and EFPAG) yield
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Fig. 12: Privacy Gain (PG) achieved by differentially private mechanisms with different values of , against a MLP classifier trained on raw
aggregates and tested on noisy aggregates.
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Fig. 13: Privacy Gain (PG) achieved by differentially private mechanisms with different values of , against a MLP classifier trained and tested
on noisy aggregates.
much better utility, at the cost of reduced privacy. This shows
that achieving an optimal trade-off between privacy and utility
in the settings we consider is still a challenging task.
Finally, our analysis also shows how dataset characteristics
affect the performance of differentially private mechanisms
too. Specifically, the privacy gain on a sparser dataset (TFL)
decreases faster with growing , compared to a denser one
(SFC). This is not surprising, taking into account the scale
difference between the sensitivity of the aggregation in each
case (recall that ∆ = 207 on TFL and 2,685 on SFC).
VIII. CONCLUSION
Location privacy has been a prolific research area over
the past few years, with a number of attacks and defenses
having been proposed on mobility profiles and users’ locations.
Although this line of research has improved our understand-
ing about protecting users against the disclosure of sensitive
information, to the best of our knowledge, little work has
focused on the privacy threats that the availability of aggregate
location time-series may pose for individuals contributing to
the aggregates.
This paper presented the first evaluation of membership
inference in the context of location data. We formalize this
inference as a distinguishability game in which an adversary
has to guess whether or not a target user’s location data has
been used to compute a given set of aggregates. Instantiating
the distinguishing function as a machine learning classifier,
we quantify the inference power of an adversary with various
types of prior knowledge on two real datasets with different
characteristics. We show that, membership inference is very
accurate when groups are small, and that users that have regu-
lar habits are easier to classify correctly than those performing
sporadic movements.
We also evaluate the extent to which defense mechanisms
based on differential privacy can prevent membership infer-
ence. We find that they are quite effective if the adversary trains
the classifier on raw aggregates, though they entail a significant
loss in utility. However, they are much less effective if the
adversary mimics the behavior of the perturbation mechanism
by training her classifier on noisy aggregates.
We remark that our methodology can be used to evaluate
membership inference attacks, as well as defenses, in real-
world settings. We also hope that our techniques can be
leveraged by providers to test the quality of privacy protection
before data release or by regulators aiming to detect violations.
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APPENDIX A
MACHINE LEARNING CLASSIFIERS
We now briefly review the machine learning classifiers used
throughout the paper.
Logistic Regression (LR). LR is a linear model where the
probabilities describing the possible outcomes of a single trial
are modeled via a logistic (logit) function. The parameters of
the model are estimated with maximum likelihood estimation,
using an iterative algorithm.
Nearest Neighbors (k-NN). k-NN performs classification with
a simple majority vote of the nearest neighbors of each data
point: a query point is assigned the data class which has the
most representatives within the nearest neighbors of the point.
Random Forest (RF). RF is an ensemble learning method
which constructs a number of decision trees during training
and outputs the majority class voted by the individual trees
during testing. With RF, each tree in the ensemble is built
from a sample drawn with replacement from the training set.
When splitting a node during the construction of the tree, the
split that is picked is the best split among a random subset
of the features. As a result of this randomness, the bias of
the forest usually slightly increases but, due to averaging, its
variance also decreases.
Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP). MLP is a kind of artificial
neural network, consisting of at least three layers of nodes: the
input, the hidden and the output layers. Except for the input
nodes, each other node is a neuron that uses a non-linear acti-
vation function. MLP utilizes a supervised learning technique
called back propagation for training and its multiple layers
along with the non-linear activation allow it to distinguish data
that is not linearly separable.
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